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CREDIBILITY, DEBT AND UNEMPLOYMENT:
IRELAND S FAILED STABILIZATION
ABSTRACT
Can the credibility of a stabilization plan affect the
output costs of diainflation? The new classical economics has asserted
this possibility, but little evidence has been brought forward. This paper
analyzes the stabilization program of Ireland in the l980s against the
background of the new classical economics, The main questions are two: Did
EMS membership yield a special credibility bonus? And is the
stabilization program sustainable. The answer to both questions is
negative.
The idea of a credibility bonus Is an attractiye potential
policy implication of EMS membership: by joining the EMS, playing by the
rules of fixed exchange rates and benefiting from the stabilizing
influence of German inflation targets, a country's policy makers achieve a
dramatic turn around in expectations, in inflation and in long-term
interest rates. But the evidence on international disinflation in the
1980s shows that it was not limited to EMS members; all OECD countries
experienced sharply reduced inflation and a large drop in long-term
nominal interest rates, EMS membership did not contribute to reduce the
sacrifice ratio of disinflation. In fact Germany, on whose anti-inflation
credentials the credibility effects are supposedly based has one of the
highest sacrifice ratios among DECD countries.
Ireland did reduce inflation to the German level, but a
serious public debt problem has emerged and the unemployment rate stands
near 20 percent. This raises questions of the Sargent-Wallace kind about
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A much debated issue in the macroeconomics of stabilization is the
existence of a credibility effect and how to reap it. Can confidence in a
stabilization plan can affect the output costs of a disinflation? The new
classical economics has asserted chat this is, indeed, the case: a new program
(under new management) if it were fully credible, would lead economic agents to
set wages and prices in accordance with the announced program. The transition
to low inflation could be achieved without much delay and without significant
unemployment. Long-term nominal ssaet prices would quickly reflect the change
in expectations Indeed, in the perspective of the new classical economics any
different outcome would be the consequence of a misreading of the program or a
lack of belief in the policy makers' determination to actually carry out the
announced measures.
The credibility literature has blossomed in the aftermath of the
work of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Backus and Driffill (1985). The theory is
clear and plausible, but the evidence is primarily anecdotal. mete ace,
hovever, some attempts to lend empirical support to thts strand of thinking.
In particular Sargent (1982, 1963, 1986) has given a strong reading of this
:*rr.ispaperis part of a wider research project on the limits of public dab:
undertakenjointlywith Olivier Blanchard. I owe my interest in the Irish tase to
Terence Gormsn and Patrick Minford. I am indebted to Franceeco Giavazzi and Jean-
Pierre Danthine for helpful comments.
For a survey and discussion see Fischer (1987), Blsnchard and Fischer
(1989) and Parsson (1988).2
paradigm in his deacription of the ends of four hyperinflations. He has also
interpreted the 1926 Poincare stabilization in France as a clear example of the
model's predictions.2
It is interesting to look at the recent disinflation experience
worldwide, but particularly in several high-inflation countries in Europe to
judge the extent to which success at reducing inflation can he seen as another
instance of these texthonk cases of credible stabilization. The sharp break in
the pattern of high inflation and high nominal interest rates in the early
l983s in Ireland, Italy, the UK or Denmark can certainly be interpreced as a
response to [he shift in policies and a sign of confidence and imprcved
expectations.
The emphasis on the central role of expectations is en attractive
interpretation of the policy implications of EMS membership: by joining the
EMS, playing by the rules of fixed exchange rates and benefiting from the
stabilizing influence of German inflation targets1 a country's policy makers
achieve a dramatic turn around in expectations, in inflation and in long-term
interest rates. But there is nor only the question whether EMS membership did
in fact play a critical role. There is elso a wider failure of the paradigm in
a caae like Ireland's: while inflation and lone-term nominal intereat rates did
decline, real intareat rates turned sharply higher (fiscal correction
notwithstanding) and unemployment increased massively, as did public debt. ke
therefore conclude that Ireland's experience bears more resemblance to the
2For commentary on the Sargent interpretation see Eichengreen (1965, 1987), ¶.ebb
(1987) and Dornbusch (1981, 1987, 1956).3
unsustainable path of Sargent-Wallace 'tmonetariat arithmetic" than to Poincare-
style costless stabilization. This paper concentrates on the experience of
Ireland; it attempts to identify special EMS effects in the stabilization hut
also places it in the wider context of what happened to inflation and interest
rates in the group of industrial countriea.
Our analysis starta out with a sketch of the new classical paradigm,
using the Poincare stabilization as a concrete example of the difficulty
encountered in interpreting a ccncrete case. From there we proceed to an
analysis of the decline in inflation and interest rates in the 1980a. The
following two sections deal with the specific experience of Ireland. The
concluding section draws some policy conclusions.
1. THE NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND THE CREDIBILITY PARADIGM
Distussion of stabilization does not take long before it
comes to Stabilizationefforts succeed if they are credible, and
the more credible they are the less costly they willbein terms of output
bases. Thefavoritepolicy for credibility theorists tsastartling reversal
of a critical element of instability by a drastic, public act, immediately
recognized as such. Markets chat adjust instantly co the new reality and the
economy, in no te, acts our the new and stable equilibrium. It this section
we briefly review the theoretical Issues in the discussion of stabilization
po1.Lcy .wttn crec:on:ty enects.
1.1TheTheory
Rational expectaticr.s imply that economic agents useallavailable
informationto predict their economic environzient, including goverr.enc4
policies. The equilibrium hypothesis is that economic agents set prices, wages
and interest rates on the basis of all available information in a manner thac
achieves their plans. There is no anticipated, involuntary unemployment in this
world. In the new classical model a fully understood and believed shift in
monetary policy to e noninflationsry stance should rot lead to any protracted
unemployment: economic agents will recognize the shift in policy and will aet a
che future path of all nominal variables --wages, prices, interest races-- to
be consistent with this new monetary regime under conditions of full
employment.
Sargent (l986,p.lll) baa characterized the implications of the new
classical economics in contrasting this school of thought with the Phillips-
curve tradition:
"ge now turn to the second group of theories of inflation, which are the
But Sargent (lSS,p. 114) also notes that in those circumstances
where there is no clearly identifiable1 credible change in regime a policy
shift can prove costly. Commenting sceptically en the Thatcher experiment, he
notes:
Fir is difficult to interpret Thatcher's policy actions in terms of
the kind of once-and-for-all widely believed, uncontroversial, and
irreversible regime change that rational expectations equilibrium theories
asserttan cure inflation at little or nc cost in tens of real
output. .Wherethese conditions are not met, rational exoertatior.s
equilibrium modelsimplythat ccntractionary monetary andfiscalpolity
actions are likely to be costly in terms of reel output and unemployment..
The alternative to the equilibrium model would be a Taylor-Fischer
model ofoverlappinglong-term wage contracts. These wage contracts would bereflect rationally the public's expectations about monetary and fiscal policy
Unlike in the equilibrium model, however, the concern for relative wages of
different groups (or for real wages) leaves open the poaaibility of at least
temporary unemployment as the economy adjusts to a shock or to a change in the
monetary regime.3 Credibility effects must be added as an extra source of
unemployment. This latter possibility, of course, also exists in the
equilibrium approach. In fsct, Sargent (l986,p.llS) comments (in contrasting
the Thatcher stabilization with that of Poincare) on the difficulty in
assessing gradualist versus shock treatments.
"Gradualism itwitea speculation about future reversals, or U.turna. in
policy. Large contemporary government deficits unaccompanied by concrete
prospecta for future surpluses promote realistic doubts about whether
monetary restraint must be abandoned sooner or later to help finance the
deficit. Such doubts not only call into question the likelihood that the
plan can succeed in reducing inflation permanently but also can induce
high real costs in terms of depressed industry and lengthened unemployment
in response to what may be viewed as only temporary downward movements in
nominal demand due to the monetary restraint."
Subsequent literature in the new classical mode has focuaed on
expectations forration in a context of imperfect information games as the
central source cf a program's real effects. Following the work of Earro and
Gordon (1963) the literature views the inflation issue as a game between the
public ar.d a policy maker whoae anti-inflation attitudea are not known to the
public with certainty. Policy makers may or may not be strongly anti-inflation
crienred; consecuently hey may or not seek to fool the public into a low-
3See Taylor (1982) and MoCallun (1984) for axamplea of the effects of an
unanticipated shift in the monetary regime.6
inflation belief in order to exploit that situation by creating an output-
raising inflation surprise. To the extent that the public updates its beliefs
about policy makera on the basis of actual inflation experience, inflationist
policy makers have en interest in building anti-inflation credentials which
they then would hope to exploit later in a more dramatic inflation surprise.
That possibility exists because the public never knows with certainty the
policy mskers true preferences.
-
Persson(1988) in his survey shows thst credibility is central to the
effects cf regime changes in the new classical model. Work by Backus and
Driffill (1985, 1987) has used the reputation model tc show optimal
disinflation policies. Because the reputation issue is central to the imperfect
infcrmationgame disinflationis front-loaded: by creating immediate high
unemployment policy makers establish their credibility.
me chief point of the literature is thatthe absence of credible precommitmenc
createsinformation problems that cause unemployment in the processof regime
changes.The more a government is able to precommit its policies or
unsmoiguously signsl its intent, the smaller the misunderstanding and the
resulting unemployment -Alesina (l988b) has extended the analysis to the
political business cycle in noting the implications of thegame-theoretic model
ofpolicy for macroeconomics between miettions, inrerrrered in the context of
the credibility issue major policy commitments such as EMS membership might be
expected to carry disinflation oonuses because they change the policy game.7
1.2 4ging Credibility
How would one in fact, at the time of a stabilization program, judge
the degree to which a program inspirea credibility? Sargents own
qualifications make entirely clear that a fully credible stabilization must be
a rare event. The problem is that at the outset of a program there is no
assurance of how effective the measures in fact will be and whether they can be
sustained. Programs fflay look poor from the outset and in fact fsil; but they
may also look poor but then succeed as a result of unexpectedly favorable
developments. Alternatively, a program, may look as if it were certain to
succeed and then is brought down by unexpectedly unfavorable developments.
Finally there is the rare program that looks good and in facc turns out to be
successful. In those cases where stabilization in fact succeeded there is
rarely any evidence that this success was apparent from the outset.
In Dornbusch (1987) I review the course of stabilization in Germany
to aae the point that confidence and credibility trailed by months behind the
fact of stabilization. It. Dcrnbusch and Fischer (1986) we show the difficulty
itjudringst the outset failing andsuccessfulprograms. anote inparticular
thatout of 3 stabilization efforts, two fail. The same point has bean made by
ebb (1965)
Focusingon the credibility of a program in the parspeetive of the
new classical economics, any ds;repan:y from full employment would be a
reflection of less than full credibility. An slcerna:ive is to obsee changes
in long-tarn nominal interest rates. A decline in long-term interest ratescan be interpreted would be evidence that a stabilization program is supported
by credibility. Disappearance of yield differentials, both on short and on
long-term securities, show a disappearance of expectations of rising inflation
and increasing currency depreoiation Changes in long-term interest rates are
then measures of how public confidence in stabilization is progressing.
Applying the term structure theory, the yield on long-term bonds reflerte
current and anticipated future short-term interest nominal rates AFora given
real interest rate, thanges in the yield on long-term bonds represent changes
in the path of expected inflation,
Credible stabilization leads to an expectation of disinflation and hence to
reduced long-term interest rates. Conversely, a policy nix that is ultimately
expettad to become inflationary is reflerted in high conical long-term interest
rates. Andersen and Riaager (19S7, 1988) have illustrated this reputation-based
disinflation model by studying the path of interest rates in Denmark during the
l982 stabilization,
We turn next to the 1926 Pointare stabilization which illustrates
nar.y of the issues raised in this section.
1.3 An illustration: The Poirrare Stabilization
There are not many examples of "fully rredible stabilization", bt
the 1926 Pointare stabilization in France has become the exanole par exrellenre
as a result of Sargent'a vigorous portreval of the episode.
4See Begg (1983) for the relation between the yield on long- term bonds and the
sequence of future short rates.1.3.1 The Events France had emerged from World War I with a substantial public
debt. Would the country go the way of Germany, with hyperinfletion, or the way
of the UK with an attempt to restore the prewar parity of gold? Keynes (1926)
discussed the issues of exchange rates, debts and budgets in his Opan Letter
to the French Minister of Finance".5 He saw France's large public debt as an
obstacle tn stabilization and argued that
"the level cf the Franc exchange will continue to fall until the
commodity value of the frsnc due to the rentiet has fallen to a
proportion nf the nstionsl income which accords with the habits and
mentality of the country."
In fact, depreciation and inflation were chosen in the early 1920t
ss the means of reducing the real value of debt. The inflation was created
basically by maintaining low interest rates on the floating debt, thus assuring
exchange deprecistion and ultimately an exchange rate collapse as shown in
Figure 1. In 1921-2& the debt-GDP ratio averaged 16? percent: by 1926 it had
already declined to only 114 percent. Against this favorable background
Poincare undertook the decisive 1926 stabilization.
Successful stabilizations can only be judged ex post: many
stabilizations in their early stages (like bebies) show great promise and only
later can one determina which were the decisive events that made this one
succeed and that one fail. The Poincare stabilization was different ss udged
by the urgency of the situation, the decisiveness of the measures and the
special role of Pointsre as a known and eatablished fiscal conservative, here
is how Wolfe (195l,p.34) describes the events:
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•- anew National government was formed under Raymond Poincare, pledged to
save the Franc at all costs, A radical tax bill giving government
authority to increase all taxes 20 percent was jammed through the Chamber
of Deputies. coupled with a cut of more than a billion francs in
government expenditures.
An external loan was arranged and the proceeds were used to reverae currency
depreciation. The Franc appreciated within a month by 28%. Wholesale prices had
been rising at 8-10% per month, now they fell for two months. Stability had been
achieved!
These measures and eventa convey precisely what we would understand
to be the essential measures for successful stabilization. But (with apologies to
credibilists) the description just offered is that of the £a.U..ad 1924
stabilization, not of the successful 1926 stabilization.
Having made our point, consider next the July 1926 stabilirstion. At
the center of the stabilization is (once again) Poincare. Sargent writes:
"Raymond Poincare was s fiscal conservative, who had raised taxes while
Prime Minister in 1924, and was known to advocate balanced budgets and
France's return to gold.. as soon as he assumed control of the government.
and even before his program was enacted by the legislature, the Franc
recovered and inflstion stopped, --ThestabIlization of the French Franc
vas followed by several years of high prcsperit. The French stabilization
thus seema to fit the prediction of the rational expectations equilibrium
aDproach."
The immediate turnaround in the French Franc (Fisure 1) does, indeed,
conveythe impreasion of an overnight change in the public's perception of
polity. Interestingly, the budget had already been balanced before the crisis
got undervay. Makinen and ;'oodward (1957) reccgr.Ice this point and show that
thecrisis was related to the floating debt and interest rate ceilings, not to
the budget, Political instsbility, in particular the notion of a capital le11
promoted by the Left? had added to the motives for capital flight. With
Poincare holding office there was an immediate recognition that special
taxation of capital would not be a risk anymore, at least for the time being.
Taxation did increase, but the immediate reason for the strong appreciation is
no doubt a sharp increase in short-term interest rates ahown in Figure 2. An
increase interest rates always is a means to attract capital inflows, bring
about exchange appreciation and thus impose at least temporary inflation
stabilization.
Was the Poincsre stabilization perceived by the public as a
relatively permanent improvement for public finance, inflation and
depreciation? The movement of long-term bonds--the yield on the 3% rentes shown
in Figure 2-- suggests otherwise. There was, in fact, no sharp and immediate
drop in the long-term interest rate. Between May and November 1926 the yield on
3 rentes only fell from 6.29 to 6.02 percent. Moreover, throughout 1926-2?
(excepting mid-1926) the yield on long-term bonds exceeded the short rate,
thus suggesting a belief that stabilization remained tentative.6 Of course, cbs
realized reel short-tern interest rate was exceptionally high: In the 12 months
from July 1926 wholesale prices fell by 25.8 percent and consumer prices by 3
percent and that is how stabilization was achieved fcr the time beine.
The very gradual decline of the yield on long-term bonds, corpared
with the rapid recorsr-v o the Franc, suggests that exchange rats policy was
mediately credible. 3ut that credibility takes a very spetial form: credible
61n fact, even 2 years after successful stabilization the yield on long-term bonds
remained higher than after the breakdown of the unsuccessful 1924 stabilization.FICURE 2
FRANCE:3% RENTES YIELD AND SHORT RATE








until further notice. In that case one would expect, with a positive short-term
interest differential, an inflow of capital which supports the exchange rate
policy. Following the informal exchange stabilization, tong-term bond yields
did not fall much, suggesting that stabilization remained tentative until it
was validated by the sheer experience of the new policies and their viability.
Models of speculative attack on a fixed exchange rece regime show in
fact exactly this possibility. Even policies that mre ultimstel1 unsustainable,
they can survive for a while provided they are supported by reserves and/or
high interest rates.7 This is the key to understanding why some of the programs
that ultimately fail can be 'tapt up for a while.
1.3.2 Evsluaticn: The Poincare stabilization, judged in the context of the
credibility literature helps make two points. First, there is no realistic way
of telling whether s particular stabilization program will in fact succeed with
certainty or fail without question, The Poincare program did succeed, there
remains the question whether it succeeded because of the fiscal reform of the
previous years, the erosion of the real value of the public debt that had
already taken place before or because of the decisive support to the exchange
race.
The second point is thac successful stabilization is rarely if eve:
established from one daytothe next. The political circtatances in which
instability emerges do net change overnight. Stiff measures might be taken, 'cut
7See Salant and Henderson (1978), Krugman (1979), Flood andCarber (1984) and Dornbus:b(1987),13
there is no assurance that they will not be revoked the next day (as was the
case in France in 1924). There is no effective precommitment and hence
stabilization is something that can only be established with the passage of
time. Once the public adapts to the new reality, and views stability as the
rule, this stability is extrapolated and is reflected in reduced long-term
interest rates. In the short run credibility thrives mostly from tight money
and a fixed exchange rate. The behavior of long-term interest rates in Franca,
following the 1926 stabilization, certainly does not suggest an immediate
confidence in a sharp break of the inflation process.
1.4 Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
A final strand of lIterature highlights the izplioationa of
unsustaInable (and hence incredible) policy regimes. Sargent and 1.'allaoe (1981)
have explored the implications of an unsustainable shift to tIght money. They
consider a world where budget deficits are financed by money and debt. A shift
toward reduced money creation implies accumulation of debt and a rising
interest burden.
If debt grow:h becomes excessive the shift to tight cannot be
sustained: ultimately. to avoid insolvency inflationary money creation becomes
necessay as a means to finance the accumulated interest bill. Sargent and
allace conclude(Sargent (198G,p.l39):
"without help from the fisral authorities, fighting current inflation with
rich:monetary polity must eventually lead to higher future infation."
This problem is of interest because in several European countries,
moat notably in Ireland, inflation stabilization by tight money has, in fact,14
translated into an extraordinary fiscal problem: the debt ratio has risen far
above 100 percent and keeps rising. There is a genuine question of how the
mushrooming of debt can be stopped and whether future inflation will be che
answer. Historically there is ample precedent for debt reduction through
inflation and capital levies as Alesina (l988a) and Eichengreen (1988) have
shown. The question is which way Ireland might go. If high future inflation,
with the benefits of seigniorage and inflationary debt liquidation is the
answer, the question arises why nominal long-term interest rates have declined
so much.
Weturnnext to the Irish stabilization to see how much credibility
factcrs can be discerned in that experience.
2. DISINFlATION IN IRElAND
After having pegged its exchange rate to the pound sterling since
1922 Ireland abandoned the sterling peg in 1978 and joined the EMS. And as the
ENSbecameincreasingly a zone of monetary stability, Ireland played the game
with gteat success. By 1988 inflation had declined practically to the Cenan
level! TheIrishexperience would thus seem to bear out the argument that ENS
membershipwas an effective disinflation device for couricries who had lacked a
firm anchor and hence were experiencing drifting, high inflation races.
This argument has been advanced in a number of recent papers
including Akerhoim (1988), Collins (1988), Ciavazzi and Pagano (1987),
Ciovanniniand Cievazci (1987, 1989), as wellas Andersen and Risager (1987).
Akerholmsumnarizes this hypothesis as follows.15
"By joining an international fixed exchange rate area like the ENS,tha
country could demonstrate a atronger commitment to a fixed exchange rate;
a depreciation is no more a unilateral affair but requires the approval of
all the participanta in the currency area. Furthermore, short-term
borrowing facilities and co-operative errangements would be made available
in order to safeguard the financiel base for intervention at times of
market unrest. Hence, the risks of a depreciation are reduced, which
should help reduce risk premis and impose more flexibility on the behavior
of the labor market."
As we shall see asset markets did, in fact, show a response in the
sense of credibility although that effect did not go all the way to the
elimination of yield differentials, Because yield differentials did remain
high,whileinflation differentials vanished, real interest rstms increasingly
became a problem. But an even more important issue was the lack of a flexible
labor market. A major fiscal contraction hsd no counterpart in a crowding-it of
net exports via increased international competitiveness. The elimination of
inflation therefore gave rise cc a fiscal problem and unemployment of
unprecedented proportion.
2.1 :nfletion and interest Rates
The yield on 15-veer bonds in Ireland peaked in Febnoarv 1962 and by
October had declined by 5 percentage points. The rapid decline of long-term
interestrates was merched, asshown in Figure 2. by a shar decline in
inflation.Teble 1 shows the decline in yields across maturities. Followir.g the
rapid decline of rates by 400 beefs pcinta in 1982; they declined by another
tOO basis points over the perIodto 1988Inflation fell even more, so much so
ther by mid-1988 Irish inflation was not significantly different from chat of
Germany.FIGURE 3
IRELAND:INFLATIONAND LONG—TERM RATE
(PERCENT, INFLAflON OVER PAST 4QTRS.)
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Table 1Irish Bond Yields
(%,quarterlyaverage)
Money Market 1 Year 5 Years 15 Yeara
1982:: 19.4 18.7 18.7 19.0
l982:IV 14.6 13.3 14.7 14,7
1988:11 7.5 6.8 9.6 9.7
Source: Central Bank of Ireland and IMP
The magnitude of the decline in yields is far more rapid and aizeable
than what occurred during the Poincare stabilization. The immediate question is
to know what happened in politics and/or economic policy to bring about so
massive a change in interest rates? Table 2 ahows the main events in politics,
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy.
Table 2 Main Economic and Political Events
Date Event
1961:
May 21 Announcement of Election
June 30 Coalition of Fine Cad and Labour Parties takes office with
Garrett Fitzgerald as Taoiaeach
Supplementar budget
M5 realignment, Irish pound unchanged but devalued 5.5% againat
DMazk.
White paper "A Setter Way to Plan the Nation's finances"
1982:
Jan. 27th Budget tightening defeated in the flail and government Tine
Caelflsbor coalition government falls.
Feb. 2nd EMS realignment, but Irish central rate unchanged
March 9th Fianna Fail Government with Charles Haughey as Taoiseach
March 25th Tight budget of January passed (with some changea)
April 14th Central bank "Statement on Monetary Policy" announces 14% credit
growth guideline with 7% for the 6 months to August 1982.
June 12th EMS realignment with Irish central rate unchanged, but devalued17
relative to DMark.
July 30th Freeze on special pay increases in the public aector and embargo
on recruitment until March 1983,
Oct. 21st White Paper "The Way Forward" ie published propcsing severe cuts
and the elimination of the budget deficit by 1986.
Nov. 4th Announcement of General Election
Dec. 14th coalition of Fine Gael/Labor takes office with Garrett Fitzgerald
as Taoieeach
1983
Feb. 9th New budget, including deindaxation of tax brackets, higher top
rate, increase in VAT rates by 5 percentage points, 1 percent
income levy, residential property tax
Feb. 20th Central Bank announces 11% growth credit guideline
March 21st EMS realignment, Irish central rate deprerieted by 3.5 percent.
July 29th Additicnsl measures to raise revenues
1984:
Jan. 25th New budget- -moretaxes
Feb.25th central Bank announces no formal credit guidelines, but
recommends 10 percent.
1985:
Jan. 30th New budget-- more taxes
Msrch 8th centrsl Bank sets 8% "indicative" credit guideline
1986:
Jan. 29th New budget-- more taxes
March 6th EMS realignment, Irish parity unchangedbut devalued 3% relative
to DMark
August 2ndEMS realignment: Irish pound devalued by 8% against EMS currencies
1987:
Jsn. 12 ENS realignment: Irish pound central rateunchanged but devalusd
3%sgsinst DMark.
Jan. 21 Ceneral election announced for Feb. 17th
March 10thFianna Fail with Charles Hsughey as Tscisaach takes office
July 12th Govt.announces voluntary publicservant retirement scheme vith
an nten:ionto shed10,000
Oct.12thProgrne for National Recovery" agreement between gcvement
and socialpartners: agreement on budget balancing, pay, tax
reform,2.5 percent ceiling on public sector pay incteaaas for
1958-90. Better targeting of govt. social policies
Ott, 13th Estimates for 1988 imply a 6% reduction in nominal spending.
1988:
Jan.27th New budge: limits PSBR to 8.2% cf GNP, downfrom10.3 with
spending cuts, taxbasebroadening.18
Source: GECD Economic Surveys Ireland, various isauea
It is tempting to aaaign to EMS membership and specifically the
policy of not seeking large realignments a central role in the shift of
inflationary expectations. We investigate that hypothesis in more detail below.
2.2 The 1982 Adjustment
The height of instability prevailed at the beginning of 1982 when
the government fell on the issue of a tight budget. Early 1982 provides a
watershed not in the sense that the need and willingness to implement
stabilization first became apparent. Certainly the need for auscerity had been
clear at least since 1981. Figure 4 shows the long-term interest differential
with Germany. This differential increases sharply toward the end of 1981 and
the beginning of 1982 and then falls off rapidly. The decisive fact of early
l982was that a political ccnsensua emerged to actually push these measures
forward. Moreover, this consensus survived changes in government and thus
rained tomentum. The consensus supported four specific policy measures:
• A shift toward consistently positive and high real interest rates.
5 shows the realized real short-term interest rste. After a pattern of
negative rates, starting in 1982 real rates are always positive and
• A fixed exchange rate policy in the context of the EMSprovideda
strong anchor. It s especially significant that in both 1982 EMS realignment
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IRELAND:THE REAL INTEREST RATE
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.Afiscal policy of consistently reducing the primary deficit,In
1979.81 the primary budget deficit had averaged 7.2 percent.In 1982 there was
a reduction to 6.2 percent, followed in 1983 and1984 by a further reduction to
only 1.9 percent. Fiscal action thus wasdrematic.8
Partly as a result of ricing unemployment, partly as aresult of
wage agreements the increase in labor compensationslowed down from 18,1% in
1981 to only 14.4% in 1982.
An essential element in translating these factors into a reductionof
long-term inflation expectations was the emerging politicalconsensus on the
need for fiscal correction following the inflation of 25% per yearin late
1981. The fact that the new Fianne Fail government in Marohsubmitted broadly
the same budget as the one on which the previous governmenthad fallen
substantiates this consensus.
The various pieces of the stabilization effort had strongly
reinforcing features. Specifically tight monetary policyassured that credit
demand would be financed abroad since the cost of borrowingabroad (including
reduced exchange depreciation) now seemed lower than domesticloan rates. That
in turn meant capital inflows and hence support for the exchange rate.cith the
exchange race strongly supported by capital inflows, nominal
interest rates
could come down to a narrower differential.
The decline in nominal long- term interest rates can thus be
interpreted as e response to the policy package and to the factof a major
reduction in inflation. A special role must go to the exchange rate policy.Not
8The data are set out in the appendix.20
taking advantage of an EMS realignment for devaluation in 1982 signified a
shift from an accommodating exchange rate policy to a determined effort to
squeeze inflation. At this stage the EMS was clearly becoming an instrument of
disinflation. The resulting change in exchange rate expectations allowed a
decline in short and long-term interest rates.
It is also interesting to note that in 1982 the term structure was
basically flat. In terms of models of policy makers' reputation there is no
suggestion (perhaps surprisingly) that confidence was stronger in the near term
than in the long term. Interpreting the term structure in terms of risks of
depreciation the premium above Cermsn rstes was flat across maturities. We
return to this point below.
2.3 Post-1982 Consolidation
Following the initial adjustment in interest rates, the period from
1982 to 1988 shows steady further decline in rates. Over this period inflation
was brought down to less than 2 percent1 the primary budget moved all the way
to surplus and unemployment increased to above 18 percent. Much of the budget
progress was concentrated in 1963-84 when the Drirnaty deficit was brought down
to less than 2% of COP. Infistion declined rapidly and already by 1984 had
already fallen to the level of the averaae of the 12 European countries and
then kept up with the pack.
One especially interesting episode in this period of cor.solidation is
late 1986 and early 1987. In this period the pound sterling (not in the ENS)
weakened against the EMS currencies. Sterling is of special interest to Ireland21
because mote than 40 percent of imports come from the UK and the UK market
accounts for more than 30 percent of Ireland's exports. Starting in mid-1985
sterling started depreciating, reaching a cumulative peak of 38 percent
(against the DM) in the first quarter of 1987. Thia depreciation caused a
growing loss of competitiveness in Ireland and hence raised increasingly
questions about the country's ability to hold on to the EMS central rate.
In the first 1986 realignment the Irish rate was not moved, but in
the August 1986 realignment Ireland devalued by 8 percent. But this realignment
was insufficient to allay the fears that further devaluation might ensue. These
fears were reinforced by slippage on the budget correction. The long-term
differential with Germany increased from 3to8 percent in this episode,
highlighting the fear of depreciation. (See Figure 4) The government fought the
deteriorating expectations, and the resulting capital outflows, with a sharp
tightening of monetary conditions. The short-term interest rate increased frcm
10 percent to 14.6 percent. Pressure on the Irish pound stopped only when
sterling stopped declining in early 1987.
By 1988 strengthening of fiscal contractioo, continuing high real
interest rates and the resulting high unemployment brought down inflation to
German levels and short and long-tan nominal interest rstea had declined to
lass than 10 percent. There continued to be a differential relative to OH
rates, but little queation that the Irish pound, for the time being, was a
harder currency. -
Beforeasking questions about the sustainability of the program we
turn to an international comparison. In the 1980s long-ten interact rates22
declined worldwide. It is therefore interesting to ask how theIrish experience
compares with that of other countries, Specifically, how isuch of the decline in
inflation and interest rates Ireland was due to worldwide factorsand how much
can be attributed to the stabilization?
3. INTERffiATIQfl COMPARISONS
In this section we review the international disinflation
experience
and the pattern of declining long-term interest rates worldwide,The evidence
is relevant in judging whether EMS membership playedan obvious and major role
in the Irish disinflation. To answer that questionwe consider evidence on
three points;
• There was a worldwide disinflation and reduction in long-term
interest rates in the 1980s and thus Ireland's case wssby no means special.
•We considerevidence on whether EMSmembershipexerts a credibility'
bcnus and thus reduces the costs of disinflation.
• It is also interesting to ask whether the Irish reduction in
interest rates is unusual in view of the large accunulation ofdebt. To address
that question we look at the role of inflation and fiscalfactors as
determinants of long'term interest rates in a cross section ofcountries,
3.1 Interest Rates and Oisinflsn
Ireland was not the only country to experience disinflation in the
lSEOs. On the contrary, evefl' single OECOcountry went through the same shift
in policies and enjoyed a reduction in inflation andan accompanying reduction
in long-term interest ra:as.23
31.1. International Disinflation and Interest Rate Reduct.iQrLL Figure-I-6 shows
the change in inflation and in ions-term interest rates
for 18 OECD countries
The common experience of disinflation challenges at afirst level the view that
EMS membership may have provided especially favorable
disinflation conditicns.
Figure 7 shows long-term interest rates in Cermany,Denmark and
Ireland and Table 3 supplements the information with deta for Italywhile also
showing inflation rates.
Table 3Long-term Interest Rates and Inflation
(Percent)
Inflation& Longternt Interest Rate
0 DR IRL IT US 0 DR IRL IT US
1981 4.0 10.117,4
-
18.5 9.7 10,419.3 17.3 20.6 13.9
1982 4.4 10.615.2 16.2 6.3 8.9 20.517.0 20.913.0
1983 3.37.610.415.33.3 7.9 14.413.9 18.0 10.6
1984 2.05.7 7.7 10.23.7 7.8 14.014.6 15.0 12.3
1985 2.25.35.08.83.1 6.911.612.7 14.3 13.8
1986 3.14.95.68.02.6 5.910.511.111.76.1
1987 2.15.02.75.63.3 5,611.911.311.38.7
1988b 1.84.32.34.6 33 6.510.59.512.19.3
5CDP deflator binterestrates forMay, inflaticnfrom the ECMay-June fcrecast.
Source:Commission of the European Communities
TheFigure and Table bring out the common experienceof a sharp
decline in interest rates in 1982-83.
3.1.2TheAndersen-Risazer Model of Denmak: Andersen and Risager (1987, 1966)
studiedthe decline in interest rates in Denmark using as theirfrsnework of
analysis s game with incomplete information between policy
makers and theFIGURE 6
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public. The wage-setting public does not know at the outset whether the
government is or is not the inflationist type in the way modelled by Barro and
Cordon (1983). Upon adoption of exchange rate targets there is an immediate
decline in short-term interest rates. But uncertainty about thegovernments
true nature persists and is reflected in a positively sloped term structure
which reflects the possibility of an ultimate devaluation.
In this analysis actual experience of reduced inflation and anti-
inflation policy decisions and the fact of a fixed exchange rate lead to a
gradual reinforcement of the belief that ftjg policy maker is not inflationist.
As a result over time the level of long-term interest rates further declines,
The term structure premium vanishes as the public conaolidatea their belief
that government does not harbor the intention of an ultimate inflation burst.
This model is used by Andersen and Risager to identify the key policy
decisions that load to a change in expectations and thus to a decline inlong-
term Danfsh interest rates and in the term structure premium. Theseeventa,
involving wage agreements fiscal agreements and exchange rate decisions not to
devalue occLr in the period from October 1962 to May 1983 as shown in Table
The events thus lag sorswhat or. the decline in Irish rates the firstpart of
which had already occurred by fall of 1962. There is aninteresting question tc
hiowwhether Denmark drew on the Irish precedent.25
Table 4Interest Rates in Ireland and Denmark
(Percent)
DENMARK IRElAND
Short Long Short 1-Year 15-Years
1982:1 13.1 20.3 19.418.7 19.0
1982:2 18.9 21.1 20,0 18,4 18.4
1982:3 14.6 20.9 16.6 15.9 16.5
1982:4 18.8 19.7 14.6 14.7 14.7
1983:1 17.6 16.1 17.3 14.4 14.4
1983:2 9.6 14.1 14.913.4 13.6
Source: EC and Central Bank of Ireland
The incomplete information game may perhaps apply toDenmark
(leaving open the question why the termstructurepremium reemerged strongly in
1983:2) but does not fit the case of Ireland where the termstructure remained
entirely flat if not even negatively sloped. This patternis not consistent
with a model where the policy maker is incompletely
believed and it is
suspected that there is some probability of a futuredevaluation. Of course,
Irish interest rates remained high relative to Germaninterest rates as already
seen in Figure 8 and that means there was either expecteddepreciation ora
risk premium, but this was uniform across maturities.If the policy game model
were relevant we would see a long rate differentialabove the short
differential though declining. But Fieure 9 shows the opposite pattern.
There is, of course, a more fundamental sense in whichthepolity
gsme model does not apply to lrelan As wewill see below, I:iah unemplostent
baeically doubled under the stabiliration plan. Thatisnot consistent with the
full-employment equilibrium model.FIGURE 8
LONGIERMINTEREST DIFFERENTIALS
(PERCENT.COMPARED TOGERMANY)
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3.2 The Cost of Disinflation
Consider next the question whether EMS membership confers specisl
disinflation advantages. That question has been addressed in an extensive
literature on the EMS and especially by Ungerer et al (1986), Rogoff (1985),
Collins (1988) and Cuitian cc al (1988). Both Rogoff and Collins emphasize that
inflation convergence did not occur in the first few years of the ENS; indeed,
a tendency toward converges only atartaafter1982. Moreover, as alresdy noted
above most industrialized countries had reduced by 1988 inflation rates to
blow 5 percent, independent of EMS membership. Ungerer et al (1986) did find a
significant EMS effect in estimated inflation equations, but their findings are
rightly questioned by Collins.
Rather than considering the question of inflation convergence and the
possibility of an EMS-induced break in the inflation performance there is an
alternative approach that focuses on sacrifice ratios. The sacrifice ratio- -
definedas the number of extra percent unemployment years per percent reduction
in inflation-S measures the cost of disinflation. If EMS membership conveys
special disinflation advantages we would expect, other things equal, a lower
sacrifice ratio forEMSmembers. Table 5 shows the sacrifice ratios for all
OECD members (except Turkey and Iceland) for the disir.flatior. experience of
1981-1988.27
table5 sacrifice Ratio of Disinflation: 1981-83
Country Sacrifice Ratio Country Sacrifice Ratio
Australia 7.65 France* 141
Netherlands* 5.03 Italy* 1.02
Cermany* 4.17 switzerland 0.81
Spain 3.70 Norway 0.68
lreland* 2.41 Japan 0.66
Austria 2.29 Luxemburg* 0.52
Canada 2.18 Portugal 0.44
Greece 2,08 sweden 0.27
Belgium* 1.98 Finland 0.25
UK 1.54 US -0.09
New Zealand 1.53 Denmark* -0.11
*h5 members
Note: The sacrifice ratio is calculated aa the ratio of the cumulative
unemployment above the 1981 level divided by the disinflation between 1981 and
1988, using consumer price inflation. All data from OECD Economic Outlook.
It is immediately obvious that EMS membership does not make for small
sacrifice ratios and a regression (not reported here) bears out that fact. It
is striking that Germany, whose anti-inflation reputation is supposed to give
the EMS the credibility bonus has one of the highest sacrifice ratios. This
evidence should firmly lay to rest the view that EMS membership can make
disinflation easiet; it may make it more credible, but even so ft certainly
does not make it cheaper in terws of lost output.
3.3 Convergence
RAther than focussing qn disinflation we can also lock at the
prospects of inflation differentials. If we are willing to assume that long-
term real interest rates are equslized across countries then nominal interest
differentialson 1ong cen securities represent trend differentials in28
inflation, Alternatively, without any assumption about real interest rates,
long-term interest differentials represent trend bilateral exchange rate
changes. Table 6 shows the average and standard deviation of bilateral long-
term interest differentials of various countries with Germany.
Table 6 Interest Differentials With Germany
1976-1979:1 1979:2-1982:4 1983-1988:1 1988a
Avg. Stdev. Avg. Stdev. Avg. Stdev, Avg.
Belgium 2.2 0.72 3.47 0.95 3.12 1.11 1.8
Denmark 7.3 1.70 9.42 1.60 5.62 1.16 4.0
France 2.6 1.10 4.90 1.66 4.11 1.15 2.9
Ireland 7.8 1.14 7.39 1.06 5.78 1.06 3.0
italy 7.3 1.50 9.23 2.30 6.28 2.35 5.6
Netherlands 1.7 0.50 1.32 0.32 0.540.18 0.1
13K 6.6 1.20 4.66 0.94 344 0.58 3.2
US 1.3 0.69 3.19 1.03 3.181.09 2.6
aAua t
It isapparent that differentials between EMSmembersand Germany are
neither smaller nor more stable than those between noruuembers and Germany. In
fact, current inflation differentials have narrowed more than long-ten
interest differentials. This suggests that trend depreciation of exchange
razes is expected to remain a characteriatic of the EMS, except between Germany
and the Netherlands.
3.5 Determinants of Lane-ten Interest Razes:
The literature on long-term interest rates has been relatively
unsuccessful in explaining the large changes in the 1980a in individual
countries. 1e useinternationalcross section evidence to identify the key2g
determinants of long-term interest rates. In particular we are interested to
separate out the role of inflation of fiscal variables and once again any
special EMS affecta.
In country studiee there aay be some scope to use aurvey data and
budget forecasta as explanatory variables for (forward-looking) long-term
interest rates, but there is little hope to do so for a large group of
countries. In fact, even consistency of the fiscal dsta may already ha an
issue. We therefore concentrate on current actual variables. Our cross section
covers the main industrialized countries with annual data for the time period
1974 to 1997.
The basic question is what role inflation and fiscal variables play
in determining sn individual country's long-term interest rate. We also want to
know whether the EMS plays s special role in the determination of long-term
interest rates of partner countries. The basic hypothesis is that a country's
long-term interest rate, given external interest rates, is higher the higher is
the rate of inflation. If fiscal variables are to play a role we would expect a
non- interest surplus to be an indication of stabilization and reduced future
inflation. As such it should imply a lower long-term interest rate. finally, if
fears of Sargent-Wallace inflstionsr debt liquidation are a concern we expect
a higher debt/CNP ratio to imply a higher expected rate of inflation and hence
a hfgher interest rate.
In Table 7 we use a pooled annual data of industrialized countries
for the period 1974-87 to uncover the determinants of the large shIft in long- -
terminterest rates among industrialized countries.3D
Table 7The Determinants of Longterm Interest Rates: 1974-1987
(Rate —s+a1Debt +2Budget +a3Inf ÷ 5GER+a5EMS+ a6*INFDIFF)
a1 a2 53 54a R2
15 COUNTRIESa
1. 7.07 0.017 -0.190.37 0.42
(19.5) (3.28) (-2.71) (10.7)
2. 6.80 0.013 -0.220.33 0.13 0.44
(16.4) (2.47) (-3.10) (9.21) (2.83)
3. 6.51 0.005 -0.22 0.37 0,07 1.77 0.50
(18.3) (0.91)(-3.39) (10.5) (1.5) (4.83)
4. 7.6 0.01 -0.20 0,24 0.21 0.45
(19.7) (2.1) (-2.89) (4.78) (3.38)
11 EUROPEANCDUNTRIESb
5.7.1 0.013 -0.18 0.40
(17.3) (2.52) (-2.40) (10.3)
6. 6.31 0.011-0.20 0.35 0.18 0.52
(11.8) (2.22) (-2.69) (7.79) (2.24)
7. 6.93 0.005 -0.27 0.26 0.42 0.55
(13.6) (0.94) (-3.82) (3.58) (8.71)
8. 5,97 -0.006-0.28 0.29 2.12 0.46 0.64
(12.5) (-1.25) (-4.44) (4.51) (6.36) (10.45)
Note:5US, Japan, Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,France,
Netherlands. Luxemburg, Italy, ireland, 17K, Sweden, Norway 0Se as a except
for US, Japan, Canada, and Australia.
Thefollovingvarfables were used: Rate: longterm government bond yield: Debt:
BC andOECDestimate of government net debt; Budget: EC andCR00estimates of
theprimary budget surlus; INF: the annual rate of CP1 thfla:ion: CER: the
German lonsterm interest rate; EMS: a membership duv which is 1 since 1979:
INFDIFF— differential of inflation with Germany.
Equations 1. and 5. explain long-term interest rates by debt ratios,
the non-interest budget and the inflation rate. Each of the explanatory31
variables has the expected sign and is significant. Note that thecoefficient
cf inflation is significantly different from unity. This is not surprising
because current inflation is certainly not a good indication (on aone-for-one
basis) of future inflation, in addition, of course, there is no presumptionof
s constant real interest rate, A further interesting point isthe role of the
debt ratio. Net public debt (as a fraction of GD') has a significant positi\Te
effect on long-terN interest rates. But the effect is quantitatively small in
that an extra 60 percent of GD? in debt raises the long-term rate by only a
percentage point.
A difficulty with equations 1. and 5. is that they concentrate
extlusively on national determinants and do not allow for a commonworld
capital market or constraints from a monetary regime like the EMS. Wetherefore
now turn to these factora. In our discussion we concentrate on the regressions
for European countries.
Equation 6. introduces the German long-term interest rats (forthe
other European countries) as an additional explanatory variable. This procedure
assumes that Germany sets exogenously its policies and long-ten rate,but that
the rest of Europe is influenced by the German rate. We obsee that the German
rate is, indeed significant. Higher German rates raise interest rates inother
European countries. At the sac time the debt variable becomes insignificant.
Further regressions show the influence of the inflation differential
between a coun;r s.nd Germany (flTFDIFF). This variable, too, is highly
significantandthe size of its coeffioients is large and thus helps account
forthelarge differences in long-term interest rates. Finally we look for an32
EMS effect, interestingly (and contrary to expectations if the EMS is seen as a
stability Club) the EMS coefficient is positive. EMS partners, other things
equal, have.higher nominal interest rates. The proper interpretation is that
the EMS dummy is phased in 1979, exactly at the time long-term interest rates
become very high. it thus helps explain the high interest rate period rather
than tracking special membership effects,9
A particularly interesting finding is the absence (except in 1.. 5.
and 6.) of the Sargent-Wallace effect. Debt ratios per se simply do not appear
as determinants of long-term interest rates. This is a striking finding because
it runs so much counter to the belief that extremely high debt ratios Cas that
of Irelsnd, for example) should be predicting financial trouble. Contrary to
that notion, the equations support the view that current flows variables such
as the non-interest budget and current inflation contain more information than
thestock position. Thissuggests that asset markets do not see high debt
stocksas predicting specialtaxation of assets or inflation as a risk.
3.5Sumrcarv
In this section we have lookedat international evidence cf special
EMSeffects. The hypothesis that EMSmembership could have helped achieve
disinflationin Ireland is attractive in view of game-theoretic models that
emphasize the special role of precoient and reputation. Taking part in a
hard-currency club, interms of these models, would be extected to yield a
9Tharegressions use domesticrather than offshore interest rate, Thismakes the
neglect of caz variables in our analysis a potentially seriousshortcoming.33
disinflationbonus. The evidence we have reviewed here does not support the
view that EMS membership yielded the partners extra facilityin reducing
inflation or translated into an expectation of maresubstantial disinflation.
In fact, the evidence points if anything in the other direction,The most
striking evidence to the contrary is, of course, the veryhigh German sacrifice
ratio.
Wenow turn to a discussion of the costa of stabilizationin Ireland.
We have already seen in Table S steve that Ireland had one of the highest
sacrifice ratios. Our interest is now to identify why unemploymentincreased so
much.
4. FAILED STABILIZATION
Ireland has stopped inflation and the primary budget today is in
surplus. In the near-term a major outbreak of inflation and depreciationis
entirely implausible. Inflation stabilization thus is a fact.But so are two
other points: Firs:, as Figure 10 and Table B show, stabilization has comeat
the coat of an extremely high level of unemployment and in that sense
stabilization is not complete and can even be said to have failed. Second,the
debtratio has risen sharply and continues to rise. Ireland has the highest
debt/GOP ratio among industrialized oottries, far higher than :talyand
Belgium.andperhaps with lsrael the highest in the world. ln this respect.
too, stabilicarion can be said to have failed.
rue1967Ar.nual Report of the tO paints a bleak picture of Ireland
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"Only limited progress has been made so far in halting the
accumulation of large Exchequer Deficits; the resulting high levels of
taxation, crowding-out pressures and crushing debt interest bill (nearly
half in respect to foreign debt) have created a difficult environment for
investment and growth. Employment has only recently begun to stabilize
after a prolonged fall, Unemployment has climbed to the unacceptably high
average of 18.75 well above the Community average, but the figure would be
much larger had not emigration moved to high new levels recently, thereby
offsetting the strong underlying growth in the labor supply.
The triumph of low inflation has thus come at the cost (perhaps inevitable) of
extraordinary high unemployment, massive emigration and a precarious debt
overhang. 10
Table 8 Irish Macroeconomic Variables
Debt/GOP Budget Deficita Inflation UnemploymentInvestment5
Totaloperat.b
1980-82 92.8 13.3 9.9 18.0 9.5 28.0
1983-85 117.3 10.9 6.2 7.2 15.6 22.6
1586 139.0 10.9 5.6 3.6 17.4 16.9
1987 138.6 8.5 2.5 3.0 18.7 17.2
1988° 141.3 6.7 0.7 2.5 19.5 n.e.
Notea:a Percent of GOP, b The operational budget deficit is the total deficit lass
teal interest payments. crst:mate
Source: Commission of the European Communities and OECD
thefollowfngdams on thelabourforce (in DOGsperyear):
NaturalIncrease Migration Participation
1571-81 13.5 5.2 -3.4
1981-86 22.8 -12.7 -4.1
Source: DECO (1987) Table 13.
Emigretion, rather than unemployment, thus ebsorbed more than half the increase in
thepotentiallabour force in the 1580s!35
Twoquestions can be asked at this stage. One is to know why
stabilization led to high unemployment and escalating debt ratios. The other is to
know whether the Irish debt situation ia unsustainable in some well-defined sense.
If so what are the policy options?
4.1What WentWrong?
Several factors come together in explaining the extraordinarily poor
performance of the Irish economy. The firs: is that fiscal contraction per se
reduces real aggregate demand and thus reduces output and employment. The textbook
says that expenditure reducing policies must be accompanied by expenditure switching
policies if full employment is to be maintained, These have, not, in fact been used.
On the contrary, the real exchange rate has been allowed to appreciate rather than
depreciate and the real interest rate has increased sharply. Thus increased net
exports due to stronger competitiveness or higher investment were not brought forth
to make up the slack,
Table 9 shows hourly compensation (measured in $125) in treland as well
as the r.-a:ase wage (using fish export shares) of Iteland's trading pattners.
Table 9 Relative Wages
Ireland Trading Partners:reland s RelativeWage
$US 5125 (1982—100)
1978 3.87 79Ls 85.0
1980 5.88 10.03 102.1
1982 5:65 9.85 100.0
1985 5.80 10.05 100.5
1986 7.80 11.87 114.5
lggy gog 13.51 117.0
Source: 125 0eparent of Labor36
-Table9 shows a 17 percent rise the relative labor cost in Ireland since
the stabilization effort began in 1982. Since 1978 the real appreciaticn on this
measure amounts to 37 percent! There is some question on how to measure
cnmpetitivenesa and it is clear that the result would differ quantitativelyfroa
this estimate. But it is doubtful chat an altogether different picture wnuld
emerge •ll
Taking as a fact thst Ireland's toapetitiveness has sharply
deteriorated there is little surprise that there has been no "crowding in"
followingthe budget cuts; on the contrary the overvaluation policy, while
contributing to disinflation has made fiscal adjustments extra expensive.
It is interesting to ccir.pare Ireland to Latin America. Just likein
latinAmerica, initially public finance went out of control and exchange rate
overvaluation and the budget were financed by rassive external borrowing. The main
differencebetween the two experiences is that Latin America can no longer borrow
and as a result, under IMP programs. has undergone budge: cutting and real
depreciation withhighinflation. Irelandcontinues to enjoy external financing and
therefore has been able to indulge a low inflation experience. But this hastome at
thecost of dramatic unemploent because of a lack of crowding in.
Monetary policy has worked similarly to avoid crowding in. Table 10
shows thac the realized real interest rate increased sharply in toe 198Cccompared
The main problem vithourmeasure is the neglect of productivity groth.
implicitly assume that produttivity growth is roughly the same for Ireland end :cer
trading partners. The CECD Historiral Statiatics does not report productivity SrOvt
forIreland.me weights for the competitiveness measure tome from 01CC Eccnoci:
Surveys;Ireland 19g7-8g. p.92.37
to the 1970a. Part of this increase reflects higher worldwide interest rates. But in
part the higher real interest rate is a counterpart of the hard currency play which
continues to command less than full credibility.
Table 10 Growth, Seignoriage and Real Interest
(Percent per year)
1970-81 1982-87
Real Interest -2.9 6.7
(% pa.)
Real GNP Growth 3.8 -0.1
Seignoriage 1.95 0.73
flofGNP)
Source: OECD and estimate by the author
Huhne (1988), commenting on the French experiment of developing a hard currency,
notes:
Becoming a hard currency country may be easier than making the markets
believe that you are one".
Irish interest rates4 even with a fixed exchange rate policy and near-
German levels of inflation continue to exceed those in Germany. Itisnoteworthy
that the realiced real interest rate always turns out positive becauss the
government in factstuckto a no-depreciation policy. But if hish nominal
interestrants werea reflection of antc1pated depreciation one would expect
-lessof a decline in investmentsincepresumably, in charcase, ex antsreal
interest rateswerenot positive and high. In fact, however, investment declined
sharply. The experience with investment, just as the unemployment experience,38
putsin question simplistic versions of the new classical mechanism ofcredible
stab flitation -
Theexceptionally high real interest rate has had an immediate effect
on budget dynamics in a way suggested hy Sargent and Wellace (1981) with a
positive and high real interest rate (relative to the growth rate of income) the
ratio of debt to CDI' rises. The recessionary monetary-fiscal and exchange rare
mix has pushed down the growth rate of income and pushed up the real interest
rate. As a result the debt ratio is rising very sharply.
A further factor that deserves attention is seigniorage. In a strongly
growing snd moderately inflating economy the government tan finance part of the
budget deficit by money creaticn. The shift to a low inflation policy sacrifices
these seigniorage revenues. To the extent that slow growth is a byproduct. this
further reduces the scope for money creation. In Ireland, as Table 10 above
shows, the reduction in seignicrage is more than a percent of CDt and thus
represents a significant component of the deficit financing problem.
Wetunnext to the question whether stabilization can be sustained.
Is the Irish Fiscal Situation tnsuataineblel
The Sargent-Wallace (1981) model preditts that a shift towerd tight
money,given the non-interest budget, will leadtohigher real interest rates
attelerated debt acculation. 12 That protess continues urtil debt end debt
sen•ce become solarre thatthe ;overnment must resort to an inflation tax to
sen-ice the rising interest payments. we saw above that empirirelly this debt
2$ee, too,the discussion in Speventa (1987).39
effect is not discernible in regression equations. The first question to ask,
therefore, is whether the Irish debt accumulation (and that of other high debtors
such as Belgium or Italy) is simply not explosive.
The conventional debt-dynaisics model shows that the increase in the
ratio of deht to GDP, d, is given by two determinants:
• the primary budget deficit, and
the difference between real interest and real income growth;
d —(r
-y)d+a
where d is the ratio of debt to CNP
r is the effective real interest rate of debt
y is the growth rate of GNP
a is the prinary or non- interest budget deficit as %ofCNP.
Table 11 shows the evolution of the debt ratio, the compositipn of debt
between internal and foreign currency debt as well as debt service. It is
a?parent that the debt ratio has been rising very sharply. Part of the reastn was
a primarv deficit, part the hIgh real interest rate relative to low g:owtri of
output.40





1971 64.8 59.5 5,3
1975 72.3 57.4 14.9
1980 87.7 63.2 24.5
1982 96.3 51.6 45.0 5.9 4.1
1987 136.6 50.7 56.0 7.9 4.1
1988 141.3 n.e. n.e. 8.3 3.8
Source: Central Bank of Ireland
The mid-1988 forecast for Ireland's budget shows a surplus for the
primary balance. Other things equal the budget improvement (if sustained)
stabilizes or even reduces the debt-income ratio in the years ahead. But real
interest rates continue to be very high. Inpartthis reflects less then full
credibility which leaves a residual differential, even if inflation is duwnto
theGerman level.
In jud;ing whether the debt dynamics is stable at the current levels of
the parameters one has to consider the effective real interest tate ;aid on the
debt. This is the weithted average of realized after-tax real interest rates on
the domestic and (by differing denomination) foreien debt. tne comolete
Ingredients for that calculation are not available, but Table A-I in the Appentix
sets out some of the elements, It appears that a fair amount of the debt was
issued as long-tern bonds in the period of high interest rates. Giava:zi end
Pagano (1988) estimate that the average maturity of the Irish domestic debt Is41
8 years. Thus at least for the present realized real interest rates are very
There is also a question whether foreign debt is tax exempt and for that
reason has a significantly higher cost. In sum, there does not seem to be a
sensible way to Judge whether the parameters imply a stable debt ratio, one that
further rises or that declines very moderately. But it is entirely clear that a
period of high real interest rates in the world economy would make Irish debt
entirely unsustainable. Since such a scenario has a significant possibility (as
does the low growth outlook) any discussion of sustainability must recognize this
possibility.
.3 Policy Options
Suppose that one concluded that Irish debt is unsustainable, what are
the options that have been suggested? It is easy to identify measures which would
solve the problem:
-
.Taxation. Ireland's taxation is nothing short of oppressive. As Table
12 shows, marginal razes are high as is the etonomy-wide burdcr.. Raising marginal
income taxratesprovides a powerful disincentive andintreasedcommodity
taxation leads toreducedliving standards that encourage emigration of the most
skilledwcrkers.42
Table12 comparative Taxation of LaborlJae:1983
(Percent)
Total Marginal and Averages Tax Rates on Labor: Total Taxeab
Single Worker Married with 2 children (% of GDF)
Marginal Average Marginal Average
Ireland 70.2 51.7 63.8 449 39.0
oEcDa 58.0 43.3 55.8 39.0 37.0
5unweighted average, b1984
Source: OECD
The average level of taxation in Ireland is not significantly higher
than the average for all OECD countries. The major problem is that the cax
structure ia very inefficient, with large segments of the potential tax base
almost completely excluded from taxation. As a result labor and consumption are
the main targets of taxation, with taxation of corporations, capital including
land or wealth practically non-existent.
Among the feasible options that have been recommended are the following:
• Expenditure cuts are, of course, an option. They are both difficult
and oes:race.
•The GElD has made astrong case for broadening the tax base asthe
chief directIon of fiscal reform. Taxation of corporations, as noted, retains
minimal andexemptionsfrom the VAT remain plentiful. The introduction ofa
withholding tax (with foreign credit) on the outstanding external debt would also
yteld some revenue.
•A once-and-for-all capital la''on financial assets as well as real
assetsintluding land could raise revenue the: could be devotedto a reduction of43
thelevel of indebtedness. Alternatively, a recurrent wealth tax could finance
part of the deficit.
•Supply-aide policies are emphasized by many observers as absolutely
central. Unless Ireland becomes far more competitive internationally there is no
chance to grow out of debt. And if Ireland does not very rapidly come out of the
debt trap the real economy will continue to deteriorate. The gain in
competitiveness requires a major reduction in the relative wage in Ireland and
that means devaluation with incomes policy.
Depreciation would not help reduce debt burdens because halfthe debt is
denominatedin foreign currency. But for growth a much lower real value of the
punt is essential. If devaluation is accompanied by a forceful incomes policy it
can also help reduce the risk premium.
• Another direction of change, perhaps in combination with a capital
ley,is a restructuring of the debt or evenof the monetary system. Atpresent
Ireland pays a confidence tax in that the yield on Irish asseta exceeds that in
Germany by significantly more than the interest differentiel. This implies real
itnerastrates ate higher than they would be in the absence of currency
confidence problems -
meyteld differential on long-ten Irtsh dollar bonds relative to US
government debt in the period from May 1956 to October averaged 115 basis poitts.
Suppose chat is the risk premium for Irish Tholitical risk. lr. addition the
local currency debt, nearly half of the total debt, tarries a currenry risk
premium of another 2 percentage points (relative to Geriany) .Thisexcess risk
carries a major burden in the budget since it amounts to s ftnancing requirement44
of fully 1.5 percent of COP per year. This coat can be saved by refunding the
debt into a portfolio of OH, dollar and Yen debt.
Of course1 a decision to move all the way to as debt dencminsted in
foreign currency implies that inflationary liquidation and capital lavies cay
become much harder. It is therefore a step which would only be appropriate in the
contextof s major fiscal reform, thet assures that the current doubts about the
budgetprocess can be largely removed.
An alternative to refunding of the debt would be a return to an
inflation policy which generates sei.gniorage and affords (in a transition phase)
a moderate liquidatict of the long-term domestic currency debt. Such an
inflation policy is, however, increasingly difficult to conceive of es
integration in the Common Market is being pushed ahead in the direction of 1992.
Thus the country should might go the other way adopt the OMark as its currency
and enjoy the reduction in the currency risk premium on its debt. The
intermediate position is doubly expensive because it means foregoing seigniorage
and at the same time incurring the cost of a risk premium.
5. CCN:ItDTNC RLMAP.Y3
Irelandfaces a ical posr-stabilizatton problem: high real interest
rates,depressed activity and a rising debt ratio. Theorititalfailure in the
stabilization occurred in the labor market where lark of again in
competitivenessstood in theway of crowding in. As a result thegraduaflst
attempt atstabilization cannot succeed.: even if inflation ran be zeptlow and
the rise in the debt ratio brought to a atandstill, the trogram is a Leilure4S
because the extremely high and inefficient levels of taxation make Ireland a
thoroughly unattractive place for production, in the perspective of a far mote
competitive Europe after 1992 shopping for attractive production locations will
become far more pervasive than it has been in the past and Ireland is bound to
appear Llrtstttactive.
Ireland's problems are worse then these of most countries. There is no
simple clean way out because the debt is so extremely large and the tax burden is
already enough to drive people into emigration. In the lPZOs one would have said
this is the case where a capital levy should restore the normal functioning of
the economy. Unfortunately moderate inflation is not enough and outright levies
are unpopular, even if they may turn out to be the only solution.
The other conclusion we drew deals more broadly with inflation
stabilizarton. A policy cbs: uses a fIxed exchange rate to disinilate and that
requires at the same time fiscal ccnsolidstion can easily run into difficulties.
The fixed exohsnge rste policy stands in the wsy of s gain in competftiveness and
in fact easily becomes a policy of overvelue:ion. The overvalued currency then
needs to be defended by high real nreresr cares. me combination ofbudget
cutting,high real interest races and an overly strong currency creates
unemploymenton each score. There is no offsetting crowding- in methsnisc .nless
moneywages are strongly flexible downwsrdor produttivirv groh :shigh.
Neitherwas the caseinIreland and hence the countn is lockedinto a high
unemploymentand high debt crap.
LSmembership has been portrayed as an important meansofreducing the
costs of disinflation. c5haveseen that there is no evidence of such a46
credibility bonus from EMS membership. Several of the EMS members, including in
particular Germany have the highest sacrifice ratios among the OECD members.
There is some indication of credibility effects in asset markets: long-term
interest rates have followed current inflation to a very significant extent, even
though they have not gene all the way. But Irish market unemployment has
increased sharply and remains stubbornly high: half the inflow into the labor
force emigrates end the other half becomes unemployed! That experience is sharply
at odf.s with the new classical model of the labor market and there is no
plausIble way in which these events tan be interpreted as arising from confusions
about government policy. The lesson for stabilization policy is clearly that
governments must pay far more attention to the need for crowding-in through
increased competitiveness. A major real depreciation at the outset of the program
would provide the required offset to budget cutting.47
Appendix I
Table A-I Ireland: Key Economic Indicators
(Annual Average)
Growth (%)UnerapIat. inflationInvestment Current Acct.
GOP0KP (%) (%) (% of ODE) (% of GOP)
1970-80 4.5 3.8 7.3 14.0 26.9 -6.2
1981 3.4 2+6 10.2 17.4 28.4 -14.8
1982 2.3 -0.7 12.3 15.2 26.5 -10.6
1983 -0.6 -2.0 14.9 10.4 23.3 -6.9
1984. 3.20.8 16.6 7.7 21.7 -6.0
1985 1.1 -0.8 17.9 5.0 20.4 -3.8
1986 -0.3 -1.6 18.2 5.6 18.7 -2.4
1967 4.1 3.1 19.2 2.5 17.5 1.3
1981-87 1.9 0.2 15,6 9.1 22.4 -6.2
1968* 2.9 0.3 18.7 2.3 17.2 2.6
Note: *K4d-l958 Forecast
Source: EC and OECD
Table A-IIrelend: Key Debt and Budget Indicators
(Annual Average)
Budget (ofGOP) Debt Ratio Nocinal Effective -
?rimanReal Inter. (% of ONT) GNP (%) In:arest (%)a
1970-80 -5.9 2.1 72.4 18.5 n.e.
1951 -7.3 3.8 89.8 20.6 9.9
1982 -62 4.0 95.8 14.7 10.8
1983 -4.1 4.3 107.4 8.4 11.1
1984 -1.9 4.8 113,4 3.6 10.6
1965 -25 5.1 117.9 L5 11.0
1585 -2.5 5.3 132.2 5.8 10.0
1987 -1.4 6.0 136.1 7.1 6.5
1981-87 -3.7 4.8 113.4 10.0 10.3
1958* 1. 6.1 139.8 4.0 8.8
aMid 1988 forecast, ba5t0 of interest to aidyear debt.
-.
Source:EC and CECO and Central Bank of Ireland48
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